LAW AND BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY:
CYBER SECURITY & DATA PRIVACY UPDATE
Panel: Jason Asbury, Maria McClelland, Kris Torgerson,
India Vincent, & Jennifer Boling
Moderated by Amanda Sweenty
Amanda Sweenty: We are so glad you could join us. This first
panel, as you know, is for Cyber Security in a Data Privacy Breakout, to
give you some information about some of the developments in the last
twelve to eighteen months in both of these fields. The way that we are
going to kick us off is, I’m going to give a brief bullet introduction of our
panelists so that you can match faces with the biographies that are in your
background materials. Then, we are going to go ahead and kick off a
short presentation with a couple of questions. Then, we will open it up
to audience participation and questions for the panelists. Then, we will
take a short break and break into small groups so you will have private
group-on-one time with our panelists to go in depth in some of their
subject area expertise.
I’ll have you guys wave as I introduce you. Our first panelist is
Jason Asbury, and a big congratulations to him because he was named
president of Threat Advice in August, so congratulations that is a huge
accomplishment. Prior to that, he was a member of Warren Averate
Technology Group, which is a large CPA affiliated company. He brings to
our discussion, more than eighteen years of experience in the IT industry,
as well as consulting and advisory experience with many different
industries, including healthcare, IT, finance, legal insurance, and computer
science.
Our next panelist is Maria McClelland. Maria has been at
Oakridge National Laboratory since 2014. Currently, she is the leader of
the Cyber Security Operations and Engineering Group. Prior to joining
Oak Ridge, she worked for the Department of Defense for almost twenty
years in IT and in Cyber Security. So she’s got a wealth of experience for
us today. She also holds a master’s degree in Information Technology
Management and several industry certifications.
Also, from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Kris Torgerson.
Thank you for joining us. Kris is the Chief Information Officer at Oak
Ridge [National Laboratory], a promotion he also received last month, so
congratulations. We have a very distinguished panel up here, as you can
see. Prior to joining Oak Ridge, Kris worked in the private sector for
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twenty-five years with a very impressive range of experience that expands
several different industries including: retail, manufacturing, banking,
healthcare and multi-national distribution systems. Kris holds a degree in
Computer Information Systems, as well as an MBA from Idaho State.
Welcome.
India Vincent. India is a partner and a Chief Privacy Officer for
Burr Forman, one of our sponsors today, where she chairs the firm’s
Intellectual Property and Cybersecurity Practice Group and actively
participates in the firm’s Corporate Transactions Group and the
Blockchain, Cryptocurrency and Electronic Transaction Focus Team. She
also brings a wealth of experience to our panel. Prior to law school, she
worked as an engineer for Michelin. She earned her law school degree
from Cumberland School of Law at Sanford, a Master of Integrated
Manufacturing Systems Engineering from North Carolina State and a
bachelor’s in Electrical Computer Engineering from Clemson. So she is
used to wearing orange [laughter].
Our last panelist, but certainly not least, is Ms. Jennifer Bowling.
Jennifer is the Southeast Area Director, Cyber Liability Insurance, and
Risk Management with Arthur Gallagher Corporation where she
specializes in management and professional liability insurance with a
concentration in cyber liability, directors and officers liability, employment
practices liability and errors and omissions liability. Prior to joining
Gallagher, she worked in the software industry and she earned her BA in
Business Administrations from Mercer.
So, that should help you match up the faces you have in front of
you with the bio[graphies]s you have in your organization. We will take a
short break after we get through the bulk of the questions that I’ve
prepared for them and that they have graciously provided to me, and then
we will be able to break into small groups.
For the panel, the first question I have for you, as it relates to
cybersecurity is, “what do each of you see is the greatest, unrecognized
threat an organization or a business faces today?” What I’d like to do is
kick off with our areas of expertise. So Jason, then Kris, then Maria, then
India and Jennifer.
Jason Asbury: Good morning everybody. I definitely think the
greatest threat is the lack of knowledge for a lot of end users. So it’s the
educational aspects. I’ve been in the business for a long time, as we said
earlier. I’ve seen a lot of different scenarios unfold and I can tell you that
100% of the time a breach has occurred, it is because an end user has
made a mistake. It’s clear to me that the weakest link is definitely the end
user and that’s why we need to be so diligent in educating the end user.
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Kris Torgerson: Since he took my answer, I’ll go to the next
threat. I think one of the big things to be aware of, or sensitive to, is the
“not me” attitude. When we look at corporate leadership, when we look
at the investment decisions that are being made, the idea is that it’s going
to be the guy down the street. It will never be me. HR always shows up
with a better risk. Every time we risk proof something, every time we
make a small investment, the next person who is hired, the next contractor
that is employed, the next person that is brought in the house is going to
click on something they shouldn’t click on. The idea that it’s not going to
be me is making people poorly invest because the investment of two years
ago is not enough because the threat actors are maturing far faster than
we are from a competent standpoint.
Maria McClelland: So now that they’ve both stolen my answers,
(laughter) the one thing that I would add to that is technology of
convenience. That to me is one of those areas that we don’t really
recognize. Everyone likes convenience, you have eighty-nine apps on your
phone because they are easy. I was talking with Kris this morning about
this. I was curious so I looked it up. The average iPhone user opens and
utilizes nine apps per day and approximately thirty [apps] per month.
That’s nine areas for the attackers to get to you every day, thirty per month.
So convenience is great for our daily lives, but it increases the platform for
the attack. Those are the things that I—I really try to disable any kind of
permissions. I have a smartphone, but it’s really dumb because I’m
paranoid. Another area is the simplicity of weaponization of code. Like
ransomware is a service now, malware is a service. You don’t even have to
be a programmer to really utilize the weapons at your disposal. They really
are weapons of mass destruction. You can take down major organizations
with a couple of clicks. Those are the things that I see as not necessarily
easily recognizable.
India Vincent: I think my answer is consistent with the others
but maybe from a slightly different perspective and I would say it’s time
and money. We all know the users are causing a lot of the breaches we are
seeing or are at least at fault in some way. We know where the technology
challenges are coming from, but the organizations have got to decide
where to put the time and money behind it to be able to take the steps
they want to. A few years ago, it was good enough to be able to say, we
made some effort, we looked at it, but with all the new regulations from
the state level, all being different, that’s not always good enough anymore.
People don’t like to put those resources behind it. It takes a good gut
check to invest in that direction.
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Jennifer Vincent: I would agree with everything they said.
Everybody stole my answers. I would definitely reiterate from an
insurance perspective, when I’m talking to clients, you can just see that
once you get past the premium and the retentions, they just sort of glaze
over and if you start trying to dig in deep—what if this happened to you,
or how resilient are you, how many hours are you going to be down—
those kinds of questions, you can just see they say our IT folks have that.
We just don’t have the communication in organizations, some do better
than others, but the legal folks, the risk management, or treasury folks,
whoever is making those insurance decisions, as well as the IT folks,
sometimes you can’t get them all in a room together. Everybody wants to
hold on to their information, so it’s hard to get the organization to be on
the same page at times, which leads to the denial, “it’s not going to happen
to me, we are good.” And that’s what really scares me.
Amanda Swenty: Following on that question, I have one that you
guys didn’t expect. I apologize, but playing off of what you guys have just
said, it occurred to me. Do you also find that there is a critical lack of a
middle layer who can translate between the IT folks and the folks who are
either making policy or fiscal decisions or setting those policy
determinations going forward? I think we will start with Kris and work
our way over. Do you find that to be the case?
Kris Torgerson: One of the things that I often talk about is the
idea that accounting has been around since Ebenezer Scrooge and Bob
Cratchet. You’ve got all of these things and it’s a very well defined
practice. I went to college with a typewriter. My first cell phone was after
I was married. Technology is a relatively young field and what you end up
having is people who speak tech and don’t speak business. I can tell you,
if I walk into a room and I don’t stop before I sit down with leadership
and tell myself, no acronyms, no tech speak, no nothing, I will lose them
in the first ninety seconds and I can never regain them. So the idea is that
the translation lends. It’s more than just a lack of translation, it’s actually
a barrier where if your tech leadership doesn’t have the ability to speak
business, you will never get the funding you need. But they will definitely
come and lay blame where it rightfully should be laid. The business has
to get a little more savvy, but more importantly, the tech folks look for
people who can speak business.
India Vincent: Definitely, the tech folks are looking to speak
business and trying to make that transition. The example that always
jumps into my mind when people raise this, is when we have one person
in our firm who is in management and the minute the conversation turns
to cybersecurity data breaches, he says, “Just unplug the internet, that will
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solve the problem.” And only half joking. He would drop it if he could.
At the same time I think, as management, those people have an obligation
to start doing something to educate themselves as well. It’s got to be
people approaching it from both directions. From the lawyers perspective,
working with my clients on this, that’s a lot of what they will call me and
ask for help with, is trying to bridge that gap. People are definitely looking
for help in that area, in trying to find people who can communicate with
both sides.
Jennifer Vincent: I definitely think the person, or whatever title,
that is in the middle is where organizations are going to ultimately end up
going to, especially larger ones. Larger, middle market accounts, they have
the resources for that type of person. You need that type of person to be
able to communicate from the IT perspective that has the technology side
to them but be able to translate that into dollars so that the management
side can also understand that if we spend this money, yes it’s going to cost
X amount of dollars, but by doing so we can generate or save this much
money over here, however they need to do it, but you have to be able to
figure out a way to translate those two pieces to merge them together to
get everybody on the same page.
Jason Asbury: I think from a translations standpoint, there is
really a governance problem in industries management hierarchy. That
governance problem is that traditionally an organization with a CIO, that
CIO has direct oversight of that information security officer and that is
not what is supposed to happen.
Amanda Swenty: Can you describe a little bit why?
Jason Asbury: I will, yes. Managing cybersecurity is a risk
management role, it’s not an IT role. The two are very closely intertwined
but there has to be a separation and a lot of small organizations or even
larger organizations who, where top leadership, fail to recognize the real
threat they are reticent to separate those roles. I can tell you some large
institutions, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama, the CSO is a great guy
and he is a peer to the CIO at Blue Cross. That is a large organization and
they’ve recognized, we’ve got to separate this. That CSO answers to the
Risk Management Officer which is part of the internal audit division.
Governance, in my opinion, is a reason why the translation is lacking and
I think that has to be addressed.
Maria McClelland: Ditto (laughter) again they stole my answers.
Amanda Swenty: I think you guys are seeing a couple of themes
evolve across a wide variety of experience bases. Something you can take
back to your own organizations, when you have a discussion about
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whether it’s corporate governance or how lawyers integrate into that
corporate governance discussion, how they look at insuring against
problems, and what to do when problems arise. What I’d like to do, is
then turn our discussion toward a privacy focus. And again, short answers
from each of our panelists. You’ve likely read about the federal and state
efforts to try to provide greater protections to data and to privacy, similar
to the European model, which is all in the papers that we have provided
for you. What are some of the challenges for firms, businesses and
governments (state, local, and federal), as privacy protection law and
practices evolve? And we will start with India, then Jennifer and then
follow up with our threat experts.
India Vincent: From that side, the big issue is keeping up with
everything. At this point with different laws in each of the fifty states, and
then the few subject matters that have their federal regulation scheme, just
figuring out what your obligations are is a full time job, because the state
laws don’t just stick with the state were you are located. You’ve got to deal
with every state in which you may have employees, where you may have
customers. You are really responsible for knowing those laws across all
fifty states. Depending on the kind of day that you may have, you may
have additional federal requirements. All the states now have some form
of regulation but they are adding to it. California’s [regulation] has gotten
the most publicity recently. There are others that are pushing it, one is
looking at having a safe harbor, which I think is the best thing we could
have at this point because businesses are looking for, how do I know I’ve
done the right thing. I would like to see more states headed in that
direction and ideally the federal level doing that at some point but I suspect
that is way down the road right now. I think keeping up with it, having
somebody designated as responsible for keeping up with it is an important
part of managing the issue.
Jennifer Vincent: I totally agree with that. I know when GDPR
came out earlier this year and went in force, it was like chaos. Our clients
were calling: “Do we have coverage for this under our policy, am I
compliant?” I’m like, “I don’t know, I can’t answer that question.” I think
for my clients, for all the laws and regulations that are changing and being
enacted, it’s just the cost of compliance. They are going to have to get
attorneys involved, and third parties, to make sure that they’ve got all their
systems where they are supposed to be, that they are abiding by all the
latest laws and what not, and that they know what to do if there is a breach
in different states. I think for my clients, I think the number one is just
going to be the expense of making sure that they are compliant.
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Jason Asbury: I think, obviously, that everything you guys are
saying is right. The landscape is so vast for a lot of organizations that they
don’t know where to start and where to stop. The best example that I can
give you is a manufacturer. One of my favorite clients is a large
manufacturer with 30 something different locations, they do international
trade and sales. They are a significant operation in the middle of
Mississippi and they’ve got a general counsel that has been with them since
he graduated law school, smart guy, but they don’t know where to start.
And all they are doing is reaching out to folks like me and folks like you
guys asking for advice. But the issue for folks is, what do I acknowledge
as something that is really important and pressing and what do I allow to
sift through? The answer is it’s all important and pressing, but at some
point businesses have to make that risk management decision. I’m willing
to accept this risk, and this is the reason why. To answer the question, I
think that landscape itself is the biggest problem.
Maria McClelland: So, again, he stole my landscape. I had
written “know your landscape” and then built tricks off of that. As a
research facility, we have personnel from all over the world. We hold data
from all over the world, so this is one of Kris’ most wonderful challenges
right now. I will let him talk to the details of that. As far as we are
concerned, we have to know our landscape and that’s difficult because it
is constantly changing. Every time we get new scientists in, every time we
pull new projects in, we are having to do a review and figure out what that
means to us. Luckily that is mostly his problem. He just tells us what we
need to do and he makes sure it happens, but we also do have to make
sure it happens because it does affect all of us. So thank you for stealing
landscape, you can have matrix.
Kris Torgerson: In the privacy space, I think one of the big
concerns—or one of the big challenges—is IT, organizationally, is often
underfunded. Within the IT space infosec at best, often times is an
afterthought. So, when we start talking about regulation and we start
talking about GDPR, and we start talking about this extra territorial reach
where the Europeans are going to find American companies and
California is going to find Alabama companies. The IT folks are
recognizing, “boy we’ve got some debt.” I don’t know where the data is.
You have an inventory problem where painting the risk is challenging and
if you can’t overcome that magnitude, that herculean effort and just get
started it’s easy to get myopic”well the ERP is safe so we are fine.” Again
the, “not me, we don’t have it.” We just did an inventory last year where
we have personally identifiable information and if I went to my record, it
said I had it in thirty plus systems and I was off by a factor of ten. So the
stuff that was getting protected for PII, about 10% of what I needed to
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protect was being protected about a year ago. That was expensive and it
was hard, and everybody bucked and snorted and was angry, they didn’t
want to do it because, well, it’s right there in the list and you have to
institutionally recognize that it’s a collaborative thing. If legal is not in the
room, the IT guys can’t make a judgement, they are not smart enough. If
risk is not in the room—it is a collaborative mosaic of people who have
got to be in the room to determine where to start. If no one knows how
to start, pick a place and go.
Amanda Swenty: Excellent answers, thank you all. So, we have
reached our point where we are going to bring you guys, the audience, into
the discussion. So what I’d like to do, while you sit there and form your
incredibly insightful questions for our panel, is just give our panel just sort
of an indication of the scope of the audience that we have in front of us.
Again it’s audience participation time. By a show of hands, who within
our audience is a law student or a legal professional? Oh, big group. Okay.
Who within our group are technology professionals? Excellent. How
about federal, state, or local government representatives? Wonderful.
Privacy officers? Hmm. How about data management professionals?
None there, okay. How many of you are avoiding being at your desk on
a Friday? (laughter). How about Florida fans? Just checking. It occurred
to me that you guys don’t actually know who I am so I should probably
remedy that as well. My name is Amanda Sweenty. I will be joining the
faculty here in January to help out with cybersecurity, national security,
those types of courses that we are building now as part of additions to the
curriculum. I’ve spent over twenty years in federal service and I’m still in
federal service so please don’t ask me any questions about what the
president is doing because I won’t be able to comment on that nor would
I comment on that. And I do not have a Twitter account, I will be honest
about that. I’m really looking forward to joining the faculty here. If you
have ideas for the curriculum, please get in touch with me. I think our
contact information is in the information that you already have. If there
are any questions on the federal level, I’ll also do my best to field those
with the rest of our panel. So, now that you’ve had time to formulate your
questions while I’ve been up here tap dancing, what would you like to ask
our panel of experts? Either singularly or as a group?

Audience: Have you guys had any clients wrestling the GDPR that just
decided to remove their products or services from you, just until they remedy and have
the appropriate risk procedures?
Jason Asbury: I had a client who made the decision to remove
any data or any relevant information. They didn’t stop trading but they

2019]

LAW AND BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY

1073

did make the decision to remove any pertinent data that was in scope,
“permanently,” not “until.”
India Vincent: I’ve had clients do the same thing with the data,
I’ve also had clients use other vendors, where the vendor would not
guarantee the data stayed in the United States.

Audience: When they remove that data, do they remove just European
customers or do they just go ahead and whole-scale everything? US?
Jason Asbury:
European relevance.

Mine just removed what was in scope of

India Vincent: I have some of both.
Kris Torgerson: Before I came to Oak Ridge, I was in consulting
and I actually had a call last week talking about that with a multinational
retailer and they are wrestling with what to do because they’ve got
distribution, wholesale, retail in GDPR countries. So, in some instances
you can do that. They retail in airports with GDPR. They struggled with
that but they were not able to. You’ve got to close down operations
essentially.

Audience: One thing, and this goes to your ten percent of PAI(inaudible)

is where we know it is. One thing that I’ve experienced is finding that there is PAI
outside of bounds of what we normally have and my company has made significant
changes to shut down accessed information much of which is necessary for day to day
operations and people are individually granted access, almost on a by document basis
and it is creating a tremendous amount of unnecessary transactional churn to get things
done. Is anybody working on ways to—what are you—might be doing to figure out
how to keep the work going? Give people access to the data they need to get their jobs
done while still partaking (inaudible) security?
Kris Torgerson: One of the reasons why I’m in the role that I’m
in now is because borrowing the right solution—Maria cringes every time
I say this—but we’ve got to find a right way to do the wrong thing well. I
tell my team all the time there wasn’t a great IT organization that said,
“Heck, we should open a lab.” That’s not how that worked. From a cyber
standpoint, a security standpoint, and a tech standpoint we exist to serve
the business and if the business’s cash register is not ringing, nobody is
buying dinner at night. So we’ve got to find a way to enable business and
that kneejerk reaction to say, “take the old model and apply it harder”—
it’s that old adage right, if I just say it louder they will finally get it. We are
looking—the old model was a role based access system, a lot of people
are talking about data-based access system and computationally it’s easier
to find at a data level and say, “okay, how are we going to control that?”
The paradigm has got to shift and it’s not shifting briskly because the old
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role-based access system and broad access to everything. We just had a
small incident where we were worried about where our data was flowing
about pension funds. Again, it’s a daunting thing but you can’t stop the
business. To answer your question, part of the reason why I’m here is
because I won’t do that. Finding a way that enables business is critical.
Jason Asbury: I’ll add to that as well. A lot of organizations are
trying to safeguard information about consolidating it. If you think about
it, everybody in here—I see all sorts of laptops. I don’t know how many
of you are working from your local desktop or you might be remoted into
a system were your data is staying in one place. Larger organizations with
larger IT budgets, they are investing in software that allows them to
consolidate their data and they do all they can to secure that endpoint.
You see that little device right there would be encrypted, it would also be
managed with mobile device management software. It would have as
much of a safeguard protection as can be applied, but at the same time
the data would never actually be on that machine. It’s always consolidated.
Kris Torgerson: I want to touch on that too because it’s the same
thing we did. We assumed that it’s going to spill, so if it’s something you
can pick up and carry out of your office, we encrypt it. Because I assume:
(a) it’s (the data) going to spill; and (b) you are going to leave that (a laptop)
in the trunk of your car and someone is going to pop your trunk and it’s
going to disappear. From a data loss perspective, when it’s encrypted, it’s
a whole different discussion than when it’s not.
Jason Asbury: Encryption is a safeguard in most instances.
Amanda Swenty: Following up on that thread as part of our
paper discussion, we touched on changes in certain state legislation in
terms of how they deal with crypted data versus how they deal with
encrypted data. Can you talk just a little bit about that?
India Vincent: Exactly the point that has been made. Under
most state statutes, I may get myself in trouble with that. If the data was
encrypted at the time that was lost, as long as you can prove the key was
separate and the key was not compromised, you will greatly reduce or
either eliminate your reporting requirements, particularly if you are talking
about healthcare records. That’s significant because access is considered
a breach for reporting purposes of healthcare data, so encryption is
significantly helpful there. Several of the states that are beginning to
increase the strength of their laws are taking that approach as well. The
arguments we hear about not liking encryption are usually related to user
convenience: frustration with users from speed or difficulties getting stuff
off of their laptops. In my view, it’s because a lot of times people are
using the same device for business and for personal for a lot of

2019]

LAW AND BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY

1075

organizations. It’s something that definitely helps the organization, but
could be frustrating for the user depending on how well it’s done from a
technical standpoint.
Jason Asbury: If you don’t mind, I’ll add a little bit more to that,
too. It’s really relative to an encryption conversation. A lot of covered
entities are requiring that business associates have encryption at rest.
Encryption at rest means that the data is always encrypted no matter where
it’s at. That could even mean on a server in your office. It could mean
cloud service, and so on and so forth. Encryption in transit has been
around for years and that’s pretty common place, and we’ve got a good
handle on it. But I say that about encryption at rest because the shelf life
of a breach has increased dramatically from the time that the breach
occurs until it is actually identified and exposed. This time a year ago I
would have told you it was about 110 days. Today it’s about 209 days. If
you think about that, if your organization has been breached, and you just
found out, and it probably happened 9 months ago, with that in mind,
having those safeguards for encryption at rest becomes really essential. If
you are on your network, that’s one thing, but if you are on a network and
you can’t get to the data you are trying to steal, that’s another.

Audience: Going back to the days when Al Gore invented the internet,
have we grown too fast in terms of this entire technology to the point where we’re spilling
water over (inaudible) trying to capture something that might not necessarily be
(inaudible) from a security standpoint? I raise this because it seems like we’re in this
unregulated universe of information and I think that regulation—we should be going
back to the same responsibility of the companies. Is it time now that we start really
thinking about if we’re going to operate in this high tech world where everybody has
access to it—there’s a lot of responsible and irresponsible people using it—that we start
placing some burden on who makes up for it, who make up a company so that we don’t
have rogue companies that are just creating a host for cyber-terrorism that will float its
way into the US and society? I guess my question is, have we grown too fast for
responsibility of the user who is “Joe Blow” who doesn’t fully understand?
Jason Asbury: I would say we have grown extremely fast. In
2000 when I started my career out of school, I went to work for the
Alabama Department of Transportation. I was a consultant because they
had a hiring freeze. My point is my boss, I knew pretty well, he put me on
the “A” team, and I was with the network guys. Long story short, I walked
in and we had this cubicle area, there was a folding table and all the servers
that served the whole transportation department were on that folding
table and now they have a data room that’s three times the size of this
room. That’s a lot of growth in a little bit of time. That has happened
exponentially world wide. I took part in a cyber-symposium in the spring

1076

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

down in Tampa and the keynote speaker was a professor from MIT and
the interesting thing that she had to say is that, basically that academic
world is trying to find ways to determine, “hey are we doing this the wrong
way and should we be attacking cyber security from a whole different
lens?” It’s been too long for me to get into a lot of detail on that, but the
point of the matter is that the academic community and the computer
science base is really beginning to take a look at cyber security from a
whole different lens because the fact of the matter is we’ve recognized
that we’ve grown too fast and this thing is almost unmanageable. That
doesn’t mean you just stop. You do what you can.
Kris Torgerson: I’m going to argue a little bit on a different side
there. Three things: (1) as the cost of breach starts to rise—I was just
looking at an article where the average cost of a breach to an organization
of medium or large size is north of $5.5 million. That is going to shift
behavior. The reality is, even if we look at the stagey antiquated—the first
cyber security class I took was in the early 90s and the stagey antiquated
models that we were using back then—if we look at them today they are
not remarkably disimilar, they might be a little more mature but, if you
apply the basics, remember IT is underfunded, cyber is materially
underfunded. If you apply the basics and you think about your data no
matter where it’s at in transit, at rest, or in progress, you compartmentalize
it. That’s one of the things you will see in your paper when we talk about
uneffective responsible approach it implementation. There is nothing we
can do to control the whim and fancy of politicians. As the regulation
comes, if we have the regulation to drive our compliance program, we are
always going to be leaning back and reacting. Getting proactive, even if
it’s the basics—the gardener model, the mercumber model, there’s a
hundred of them out there—apply it and apply it well. Do encryption, be
responsible. The regulation is not going to be the problem. There is
nothing we can do to put that genie back in the bag. If you look at the
news, downstairs two floors below me, I have the fastest computer in the
world by several magnitudes and right now, we just broke ground on a
room because we are building a faster one. There is nothing we can do.
The reason why we are doing that is because seven or eight months ago
China had the two fastest computers in the world. This is like the old
space race We don’t get to opt out. As much as we would like to shift
culbability and liability, the people in this room own cyber and privacy
going forward.
Jennifer Vincent: I will say, since I do have the advantage of
talking to Ds and Os at companies when we are talking about cyber and
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directors’ and officers’ liability, they definitely recognize that they have a
play in this. Their personal assets are at stake, especially for, you know,
private company or public company. But I will say that I have noticed a
trend in boards specifically electing more technology related people to
their board or having some sort of, you know, IT person, whatever, you
know, that can provide insight to the rest of the board that doesn’t have
that knowledge.
India Vincent: I’ll add to that. It goes to your point about should
we be placing more responsibility or liability with those board members.
Several of the boards I participate with have been through the insurance
discussion. There is awareness on those board members’ parts of
potential personal liability, and it’s interesting to watch the ones who opt
to resign from the board because they don’t like this risk and can’t get
comfortable with it. The ones who focus on the insurance and what do
we do to make it better and the ones who say it’s not going to happen to
us.
Amanda Swenty: India, can you also touch just a little bit on the
role of lawyers and those discussions and how lawyers can facilitate those
conversations?
India Vincent: Okay, in this case I think it depends on if the
lawyer is involved with the board, are they there as the board’s lawyer or
are they there as a member of the board, because you’ve got different
things you need to be focused on from those perspectives. When I’m
advising boards and serving as the board’s lawyer, there is a lot of
discussion about what could your liability be? What have you done to try
to make sure this risk doesn’t happen to your organization? What are the
organization’s risk tolerances? There’s got to be an awareness and an act
of working through that process to decide. For some nonprofits there
may an element of, it’s not going to be us or we don’t have data that is that
important. Usually, I don’t agree with that. There is something every
organization has that somebody wants, even if they only want it for
blackmail purposes. You’ve got to keep that in mind. Is the board’s lawyer
trying to get them to recognize the risk and be proactive about how to
mitigate it? Serving on the boards, my approach is always to make sure
those questions are getting asked and to turn to either the technology
advisors or the legal advisors for the board and see what kind of answers
we’re getting. I’ll admit there is one board I resigned from because they
took the, “it’s not me, it’s not ever going to be me and we’re investing zero
dollars in this to try and fix it.” But, generally, as a member of the board,
I view my approach is to make sure the issues are raised and see if the
board addresses it, to do whatever I can from that perspective, but I also
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have to keep in mind, as a member of the board, it’s my personal liability
as well.

Audience: I had a recent vendor audit and there was a finding that the

vendor that we were using was storing our information for 30 day periods in the DMZ,
or the demilitarized zone, and that was a concept that was new to me. So, basically the
way they explained it was this greatly increased the risk of the breach of the confidential
customer information. So, I was just wondering if anybody could explain that concept
in a little bit more detail and the risks associated with it.

Kris Torgerson: One of the things that exists in IT is the idea
of compartmentalization. So, if you think of your network as a house,
you’ve got a panic room that is really, really safe and you’ve got a front
porch. Think of the DMZ as the front porch. So, I don’t put my valuables
on the front porch, I put them in the back corner of the panic room.
Having the DMZ, there are some safeguards there, but it is designed to be
externally exposed. I would never want to store sensitive data, whether it
be regulated or not, in a way that it was actually in the DMZ. I would say
that that was a significant finding, but if you think about it just in the terms
of that architecture, they’re storing your data on their front porch.
Maria McClelland: I just have to ask, are you sure? Now you are
giving me a heart attack. DMZ, like Kris says is the front porch but it’s
not just the front porch it’s the front porch that says welcome.
Jason Asbury: Well, there’s also often a lot of misuse of the term
DMZ. A lot people think of—that’s an old term a lot of networkers used
back in, you know, the day, whenever that was. A lot of people call DMZs,
what are really private sectors of a network, they’re just
compartmentalized at this point. I would think more in terms of a
quarantine space where data sits for a period of time to make sure that
nothing is there that shouldn’t be there and it can be kind of purged and
some level of assurance can be put on it that you are not bringing data
that you shouldn’t be bringing in. So, if I were you, I would ask a few
more questions like, “Is this a real DMZ? Where it’s internet facing or is
this just a quarantine space on a network that has no access to other
components of that network?
Maria McClelland: Like an internal DMZ?
shouldn’t have data sitting there for 30 days.

But still, you

Jennifer Vincent: I’ll say too, again from an insurance perspective,
you will find that carriers are asking more and more questions about
vendors. They want to know who the vendors are because they are trying
to aggregate it on their end that if they have 90% of their clients have, you
know, Dell, whatever, you know, in the background, and Dell were to go
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down, how is that going to affect them as a carrier? They’re doing very
diligent work on the underwriting side to find out who your vendors are,
what kind of information you potentially have stored there, so they can
kind of aggregate on their side.

Audience: I’ll follow up on the vendor question. So, I work at a company
that has tons and tons of vendors, and so we will contract for terms with many of them,
controlling data, we operate in all 50 states and Canada. And so, I’m a lawyer, and
we look at contracts all the time, but I’m wondering from a risk perspective, how often
should we be auditing the security of those vendors—long-standing vendors that we’ve
operated with and have master service agreements with them? Like, how often is this
landscape changing where we need to be looking at our insurance—the newest PCI
compliant—whatever the issue is?
Jennifer Vincent: I would say—speaking from an insurance
perspective—what the insurance companies usually ask for, but they at
least want to see an annual audit of all vendors but you can rotate them
so it’s a constant sort of rolling of, you know, when you’re auditing them,
but they definitely want to see, you know, at least an annual audit of
vendors.
Jason Asbury: A lot of organizations are able to bypass a number
of those audits if a vendor is able to present certain credentials through
certification. And those certification credentials require audits on their
side, so that expense is on them instead of on you. A SOC1, SOC2, ISO,
ECI, all that.
Kris Torgerson: Yeah, I think that is a good point. Even within
your Ts and Cs, start thinking about if you require and what type of
certifications you require of your partners, because, to his point SSAE16
or SOC 1, SOC2s tell you a lot about the integrity in the design. I would
definitely have some requirements and if there are none, or they can’t do
that, you need to audit.
Amanda Swenty: I have one request from our taping crew, when
you ask your questions, please speak up because the CLE is being recorded
for later rebroadcast.

Audience: I’m so angry and I don’t know if I can ask the question
appropriately. It’s sort of a two-part question. The risk management side indicated
that some people are making this decision almost as if we’ve just got to figure out what
the risk is and whether we want to put the money up. How in the world can they make
this decision, because I’m not sure that even if the insurance company—if the liabilities
are changing so fast, the cost of the breaches are so different or often times kept secret—
how do you even put a number value on risk? How much is this going cost? How do
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we decide whether it’s worth spending the money on security or not? They’ve got to come
up with some numbers somewhere. Where do they get the numbers?
Jennifer Vincent: Well I’ll say, again from an insurance
perspective, I mean you use the information you have, right? So where
they are making decisions based on information that has been provided to
them either from, you know, internally, as far as record counts, or, you
know from a network perspective, you know, what their vulnerability, you
know, is. And then they use that information, coupled with information
that we get from the insurance carriers, from benchmarking with their
peers, of just how much they’re buying. So, I mean as far as purchasing
insurance, those are the factors that they’re using and we try to drill down
as much as we can, in their particular industry, with their particular size
company so they know how much to buy. But, I mean I will say, the big
cyber event really hasn’t happened yet from an insurance perspective. And
I think the carriers are preparing themselves for it, and that’s what I worry
about because, you know, there are, you know, so many law firms that are
sort of the top tier that handle breaches and whatnot. There are certain,
you know, vendors that they all have on their panels, and so, if we have
the big one, I don’t know how that’s, how that’s going to work. I worry
about that. Purchasing decisions on insurance comes from benchmarking
and just what they do know.
India Vincent: Along the same lines, I think the insurance
question may be coming sooner than we think. We’re seeing a lot of cases
right now arguing over whether or not something was covered under a
particular policy. They’re hitting the Court of Appeals level now. We’ve
got the circuit splits already in existence. The social engineering is a big
one, and whether it’s social engineering or whether it’s computer fraud.
Forensic analysts are spending a lot of time digging into that trying to
prove how they get into one system or the other. To your point, the thing
to keep in mind is there is cost for somebody associated with those
forensic analysts or with those court cases. Usually, if you think there’s a
possibility you are going to get into and lawsuit over this, and you can’t
stop people of suing you, you’ve got to assume the risk is going to be fairly
significant. Depending on the type of data you are housing, you may be
able to say we’re high, medium, or low, but everybody has some level of
risk there to be focused on.
Jennifer Vincent: And the cost for the analyst and the attorneys,
all that, obviously, is continuing to rise.
Amanda Swenty: Did you have a second part to your question?
As gloomy as that is, as a gag gift when I left my last job advising one of
our senior tech professionals—as he would come in and ask questions that
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I couldn’t possibly answer, not just from a legal perspective but just from
a substantive standpoint. So when I left, I got him a Magic 8 Ball to answer
his questions. And sadly, when you’re weighing a lot of these options you
just don’t know what the “but if ” answer is.

Audience: So, what you are saying basically, many years ago when I was a
young associate the litigation section presented a case who was really bad in the hospital
and they said how much do you think the jury might award and the answer was basically
how big can your imagination go, that’s basically what you‘re telling us. That the
numbers are so broad—I mean some companies are looking at getting wiped out if they
don’t handle things the right way.
survive.

Jason Asbury: Over 60% of companies that are breached don’t

India Vincent: More than a year. Yeah, they are out of business
within 12 months.
Jennifer Vincent: Which I think ties us all back to, why at the
beginning—what makes us nervous is the people being in denial that it’s
not going to happen to them.

Audience: Now that we’ve all been scared straight. Could you talk about
eliminating, litigating, insuring against, and having contractual indemnities as ways of
managing different risks, and what trends do you see in vendor indemnities or even in
mergers and acquisitions agreements for representations of warranties?
Maria McClelland: So I’m not a lawyer, and I will tell you my
focus has been cybersecurity emerging threats and trying to defend against
those on a daily basis. So, I cannot speak to any of the law. I will tell you
that Kris and I were talking this morning. I give threat briefs all the time
for both of my positions and I like to scare people because they don’t pay
attention until it happens to them. I’m a prime example. I turn off
everything, I use VPN on my own, I encrypt everything, and I don’t use
anything that I don’t have to because I’ve been on the other side, and I
know how easy it is to get into. So, I’m paranoid when it comes to my
banking as well, but we were overseas and my husband happened to use
his bankcard to buy a soda or something. A month later—and I give these
briefings all the time—a month later I started getting text messages from
my bank saying that, you know, all of these charges were coming. I saw
my checking account and my savings account wiped out within minutes.
So, sometimes there’s nothing you can do. I contacted the bank and it
took weeks to get the money back. They never found out how it
happened, and this is what I do on a daily basis. There’s really no way to
say when it’s going to happen, who it’s going to happen to, or how it’s
going to happen. It just does. So, how do you insure against that? I have
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no idea because you can’t tell how much it’s going to cost and how much
it’s going to cost in forensics. We do forensics investigations all the time
for our lawyers and they’re starting to understand more about what we do,
and we have a very good relationship with our general counsel at [Oak
Ridge National Lab], and we’re starting to get a lot closer to them because
as they understand what they need from us, they understand how much
bigger it really is. I have no clue how to fix that.
Jason Asbury: I can say, as it relates to vendor management, that
a lot of the larger organizations out there are really trying to push that
liability and extend it to their vendors, and they are doing that
contractually. They are doing it either through those master service
agreements, many of them have an ISA (information security agreement),
as well as in healthcare, you know, business associate agreements. I’ve
worked with a number of organizations, especially law firms who have
done work for, you know, Walmart, Geico, State Farm and so on and so
forth. And, you know, the trend is definitely that liability is being shifted
to the vendor. I can’t speak on the legal aspects, but I can tell you that I’m
seeing it.
Jennifer Vincent: I would echo that—Our clients look to us.
You know, we’ll review contracts from an insurance perspective, and, you
know, we’re always reminding them to read their contracts because
sometimes they just—they need the business, you know, and they’re gonna
sign off on it. But, wherever they can, push the liability off. But,
sometimes if you’re, you know, a law firm and you’re wanting to work with
Bank of America or Walmart or whatever, at some point you are just going
to have to say, “Okay, we’re doing what we can do, but we’re gonna take
the risk.” And that’s just the decision you have to make.
India Vincent: I think that both in the M&A setting and in the
vendor contract, that unfortunately you’re not coming down purely to who
has the leverage at this case in most of the ones I see. The customer, as
they’ve indicated is always pushing the risk to the vendor, right now. I
would say 95% of the time I see those contracts come through at the first
pass putting 100% of the liability, regardless of fault, on the vendor. Most
of the time there’s some push back on that, and there’s a lot of discussion
about, well if we mitigate this to say whoever was at fault for the breach,
whoever failed to secure something they should have, they’re responsible.
The more sophisticated ones go from there to a discussion of how do we
figure out who is at fault and how much are we going to invest figuring
out who is at fault or are we just going to say we split it. Lots of
discussions going on along those lines. But the larger vendors, you
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mentioned the banks, they’re just saying, “No you’re responsible” and you
either do business with them or you don’t.
Jennifer Vincent: I will say from an insurance perspective that
representations and warranties sales have picked up. So, and I don’t know
if that happened after the Yahoo situation or what, but I’ve personally
noticed it in the last eighteen or so months. A lot more questions have
come in on the representations and warranties coverage.
India Vincent: And that ties back to the point of how long it’s
taking to discover breaches and in the M&A situation you are seeing the
representation that we’re not aware of and there haven’t been any breaches
in the last three years that are going to cause liability to the company. From
the perspective of the party making that representation, there’s always that
risk. You may be 90% certain there is nothing in your system, but you are
never 100% certain.
Kris Torgerson: I think two things that I’d add also. We just got
done with two years of figuring out ISAs and systems of record and who
retains the business associate agreements on one of our research projects.
And this research project, you know, has the course to change the course
of humanity from a medical treatment standpoint. Two years getting that
liability figured out. You have to recognize that the stakes are incredibly
high. Frankly the biggest concern, at least from my perspective both as
privacy officer and information officer, isn’t really the legal culpability or
the liability but it’s the reputational risk. My first career was in public
relations and I remember the old days back in the 90s when it was there’s
no such thing as bad publicity, well that’s crap. That’s a bad answer. You
have to recognize that there is a reputational risk on top of having an
agreement. The entity we are working with on this, because of those two
years, we have a far better relationship, we have a far better trust and
frankly the security plan as a result of those discussions and recognizing
who is culpable for what—If it ever gets to the contracts, you have already
lost. The idea is to use that as a mechanism to build a relationship because
this is scary stuff, and you do not want a bad day.
Amanda Swenty: We have 2 more questions on deck. I think you
had one and you had one, right? Please go ahead.

Audience: I’m an associate in-house at a vendor, actually. We offshore

insurance services to another country. We have ISO certification for information security.
Recently, we had some customers or prospects come forward and say we prefer SOC, we
have heard this is higher security. We are under the impression based on what we have
that there may be similar in scope, they are are different pools, one may not necessarily
be better than the other. SOC is more focused on accounting standands and procedures,
and ISO is more information, security, and technology based. Do you have anything to
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say about that view point, the differences between the two? And to what extent are the
standards not comprehensive?
Jason Asbury: I can speak on that. Part of this role, I was with
an accounting firm and I ran our SOC practice. That service [SOC] is
about process so if you do the same thing day in and day out, that SOC
certification basically validates that you do it correctly, that you are
following industry standards and you are consistent in doing so. So, when
you say it is accounting oriented that is the reason why—it is making sure
you are doing the same thing time and again. ISO is quality based. An
ISO certification says, not only do you follow these processes, but you also
have the highest level of quality that you can have as you apply those
processes. It depends on who is interpreting which one has more weight
in order of difficulty to achieve. The SOC is difficult but it is not as hard,
usually. The SOC is on your way up to the ISO. If you have an ISO
certification that is pretty impressive.
Amanda Swenty: Great. Do we have other questions? No. Okay,
so that means that we are into the lightening round. I have one last
question, as if this wasn’t enough to keep you up at night. I would like to
go through our panelists starting with Maria and ask each of them
individually, what does keep you up at night? What’s the thing that scares
you the most?
Maria McClelland: So that one is easy for me. It is what I do
not know. We spend all of our time studying, looking, and watching, trying
to figure out how to make the next move. This is a chess game. It is
definitely a chess game. Someone back there said something earlier about
the speed in which technology is growing. That is great but it is also really
scary because we cannot secure fast enough. Our entire mission at the lab
is enabling research. As cyber security, my job is to contain as much as
possible while still sharing with the rest of the world. That is what keeps
me up at night—What am I not seeing? We see hundreds of thousands
of events a day. We are pulling in terabytes of data. We are watching and
tracking and monitoring all of the different user behavior and all of the
different networks. We are seeing all of this stuff, but what am I not
seeing? That is what keeps me up at night. I know it is there, it is just one
of those things that you know that they are there but you do not know
they are there. It is what I do not see.
Jason Asbury: For me, I will go back to the first thing I said and
that is the end user. At the end of the day, the technology itself controls
what we can put in place of technology are pretty sophisticated and
advanced and the truth of the matter is, they work. If they didn’t work,
today’s trends would not be based on user breach. That is where it really
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is. When you think about fishing, malware, all of that stuff—How do you
get a user to do something that they should not do? So, the technology
really does work, it is really a question of how much money do you want
to spend. At what point does the technology begin to impede your ability
to conduct business? There comes that risk management conversation.
But for me it is definitely that end user. It is very clear to me that we have
to educate the populous as much as we can. The problem with that is, too,
that education can’t stop. Just like you guys are here for a CLE today, it
has to continue because things change.
Maria McClelland: I would add to that because I had written
that earlier. End user definitely, but also we tend to get complacent as we
build our systems out. We play with new technology but we forget—a
complacent sysadmin can be more dangerous than an end user, because
we are configuring these systems and then we just use default password,
or we leave something open or we forget to patch it because I am tired, I
have worked twelve hours today, that is when that exploit hits. Those, in
addition to an end user, are humans.
Jason Asbury: I tell people in the conversation, in the vein of the
CSO should not report to the CIO. No one wants to tell someone their
baby is ugly. CSOs have the tell the CIOs, “Hey, this thing needs a diaper
change,” and they do not like hearing that. That really speaks to that
complacency.
Jennifer Vincent: Mine might be a little more doom and gloom,
I do not know. Probably because I read from so many reports, I get
energy, utility reports, banking and financial type reports of things that
happen or could happen. My lay awake worry is nation state attacks on
your utility system and our banking systems, such as, what if we wake up
and everything is shut off ? What are we going to do? That is what scares
me.
India Vincent: That is gloom and doom. I am going to say this
acknowledging that most of the hands went up as legal professionals, but
trying to manage these kinds of issues for a large group of lawyers. We
like new technical gadgets. Anything that makes it easier for us to be more
mobile, to get data to our clients more quickly. I talked with one CIO at
a law firm recently and he said that he wished that when his lawyers went
home at night, they could not watch TV because he was tired of the latest
greatest gadget walking in the next morning saying connect this to our
system for me. You read all the predictions that say the next big breach is
likely to be within the law firm field. That is what worries me.
Kris Torgerson: When I was a freshly minted IT executive, the
first real executive position I had, I started to conference a lot. I ended up

1086

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 20

at this conference, and I went to this little classroom and they handed out
a pamphlet. It was a ten page document on how to hack an active point
of sale in retail. And I giggled and chuckled and looked through this thing,
and when I got back to the hotel and logged in the used case was my point
of sale at my company. We were a $5 billion a year company and a used
case at a hacker conference had printed material was my system. When
Maria talks about the unknown, we underestimate the adversary. You
talked about a nation state attack. The little festivities have been going on
in the Baltic for a while and probably the most effective cyber weapon
deployed was NotPetya—$10 billion, shut down a country. By the time
they saw there was a problem, the data center was gone. Somewhere in
some hacker conference, there is a ten page document that tells them how
to get in my house. That is what keeps me awake at night because it is not
IF it is going to happen. That is the one thing that I would—I just do not
know what it is going to be when it happens again.
Amanda Swenty: One follow-up question.
For old people like us… (inaudible). The fact that Y2K fizzled give
bolsters what was around at the time. I remember the stories in ‘98 and
‘99 the dotcom bubble was bad enough when the Y2K spending went
through the roof, and then everything crashed and burned because
nobody needed IT for the next three or four years. That is the bottom
line for the average person out there, it scared the heck out of us. It turned
out to be a big joke. So, we hear these stories but we have heard these
stories before. Is that a problem you deal with all the time with your
clients?
Kris Torgerson: It is interesting because I made a lot of money
in ’98 and ’99, slinging a lot of code.. There are two schools of thought.
The one school of thought is that it was a fizzle, and it was a nonevent. I
saw it a lot in the early 2000s that you are in here crying wolf again. I fixed
hundreds of systems in ’98. I rewrote entire pension systems, entire sale
systems, inventory management systems that would have stopped. IT is
terrible at this, right? Nobody knows how much is headed off at the pass
and how much of that adversary was turned back. Y2K was not a
nonevent. We headed off—at least I can tell you in the Pacific Northwest,
because I traveled all over and we fixed a lot of stuff. It was pretty simple
stuff, there would not have been a lot of trackers sold. You would not
have been able to go to Kentucky Fried Chicken and get your mashed
potatoes, because those are some companies that we fixed that would have
been broken. We do not toot our own horn. We do not run to the next
crisis and you do not understand how many holes in the dyke are being
patched, and that is a challenge.
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Amanda Swenty: Do our panelist have anything else to add to
that question?
Maria McClelland: I would agree. It is hard to get everyone to
understand that—like I said—until it happens to you. I have been giving
these briefings for years about securing your stuff and until it happened
to me, it really did not sink in because we spend all of our time defending.
One of the things that I am trying to get Kris and our legal team to bless
off on is having us do a real phishing campaign exercise, which I’ve done
for my other position and it basically will send out targeted phishing email
to whatever you like. You click on that and up pops ransomware. We did
it with jigsaw and you would be surprised how much attention we got as
soon as the ransomware popped up on their screen and said all of your
files are encrypted, you have just lost all of your data, please pay this. That
got their attention. Just having something that does not really affect
anyone—until it happens to them, they do not really pay attention. I
would say yeah, it is still one of those cry wolf, cybersecurity is always so
paranoid, they are telling us the world is gonna crash and the sky is falling.
Well it is, but like Kris said, we are holding it up. We need help doing that
and the only way to do that is the end user. We have got to have everyone
involved and keep them part of this whole fight, because everyone has a
critical piece in it. You all have access. If you are an end user, you have
just as much hand on the door as any of the rest of us do, we are just
closer inside.
Amanda Swenty: What we would like to do is sort of summarize
some of the wonderful conversations that we have had in the smaller
groups for the benefit of the room as a whole. I think Jennifer and I are
going to kick off. One of the interesting conversations that we had was
my take away is the discussion about hackback—Whether it is appropriate
or a really dumb idea, how many people are looking at this topic, is it a
serious look at it? As we discussed there is actually a bill in front of the
last congress that is likely to be proposed in the coming congress that will
indemnify and permit companies who have been hacked to hack back. So
take all of the nightmare scenarios that we have talked about and multiply
those times ten because now every IT professional, if this bill were to go
into effect, could potentially have the ability to go out and strike back at
the person that they think has hacked them. It is kind of frightening, is it
not?
Jennifer Vincent: I would just say I had a conversation with a
CSO that was a victim of hacking, and it was based out of Pittsburg. I
think you can go online and find out about it, but he was so angry about
it, and this has been awhile back, but his initial response was, “I want to
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hack back, let’s go get them.” The FBI agent that was there said I have a
gun, sit down. Ultimately they did find out who was the culprit behind it,
they were from China never to be seen again. They have orders to
extradite them if they ever find them. I do not think they ever will. But
anyway I just think it is a horrible idea. I get the idea but I think the chaos
would be insane.
group?

Amanda Swenty: So Kris what was your take away from your

Kris Torgerson: I think one of the more valuable discussions we
had was the idea about trying to bridge the gap socially or from a
messaging standpoint between IT and the broader business case. The
critical role that for lack of a better term, the adults in the room can bring
when some tech person starts wheezing on about something that nobody
in the room understands. There is value in there. We may not like the
message, but if we can grab them and slow them down—the story I
relayed is, I was a young security professional in a big company, and the
general counsel stopped the board meeting and told me to dumb down
the message because nobody understood what I was saying and he thought
it was important. If he had not done that, we would have made a bad
decision. I would have put the company in a position to make a bad
decision because I had lost them. I think people skills, especially of your
cyber leadership and privacy leadership, there is a translation problem. We
throw out acronyms as if they are water to everybody. Make sure the cyber
folks, the IT folks can communicate. You have got to stop them right
there. There is a reason why Gilbert cartoons exist and those people are
IT folks.
India Vincent: One of our conversations kind of started with
that same topic, but switched over to the side of communicating with the
programmers who are creating this code. There is also a need for them to
understand the security risk and sometimes that means the security group
communicating back to the programmers, particularly in the software
development field. It may make your code less efficient. It may not run
the way you want it to. You may have to adapt and make some changes,
but security is important enough that you have to incorporate that into the
code. The customers who are going to be purchasing your software want
to see that there. I think it goes to a point of separation between IT and
security that the objectives are different even though they are both
working with technology.
Kris Torgerson: If you do not mind. I was talking to one of my
development leads recently and I hate it but I am going to throw out an
acronym really quick. I asked my development lead what OWASP is. That
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is essentially a standards organization that exists for free to help developers
write a secure code. My development lead had never heard of it. None
of my development staff had ever heard of it. You have got a lot of
people that start with the company, and somebody mentioned longevity.
I have some people with thirty to forty years of longevity and they have
not invested in that sort of mindset. It is important for the risk
professionals to push on that because if your IT is homegrown and your
CIO is homegrown, starting with security in mind is antithetical to IT in
some cases. Your custom developer, that is not the first thing they think
about.
Jason Asbury: Our group basically had a discussion about
experiences and what we are seeing. I think it is really important for you
guys as practitioners out there to have conversations with folks who might
know a little bit more about what is happening than you might hear about,
day in and day out. Right now, I would rattle off probably one hundred
different incidents that I have seen and experienced and out of those
hundred I bet five of them went public. There are a lot of experiences
out there that people have that you could learn from to be able to educate
yourself and your organization, and I would encourage you to do that. To
your point earlier about developers and security, think about your
organization. I can think of a lot of clients who got some code written
twenty years ago maybe thirty, sometimes forty, and I promise you that
code is not secure. Think about that in your organization. Ask those kinds
of questions. I would just encourage you, reach out and find a network
of individuals who can share information with you. I think that is really
missing in the risk management world. There is not enough sharing of
experience for people to learn from. We just hear about the big stuff, we
do not hear about—for every big one you hear about, there is probably
one hundred small ones that have happened.
Amanda Swenty: Great. Please join me in thanking our panel
for sharing their expertise.

